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Abstract. We document significantly lower inflows in female-managed funds than in
male-managed funds. This result is obtained with field data and with data from a labora-
tory experiment. We find no gender differences in performance. Thus, rational statistical
discrimination is unlikely to explain the fund flow effect. We conduct an implicit asso-
ciation test and find that subjects with stronger gender bias according to this test invest
significantly less in female-managed funds. Our results suggest that gender bias affects
investment decisions and thus offer a new potential explanation for the low fraction of
women in the mutual fund industry.
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1. Introduction
Why are there so few women in the financial indus-
try? Pointing out the low fraction of female mutual
fund managers, the New York Times recently called this
question a “trillion dollar question” (Dunleavey 2017).
Indeed, our data show that the fraction of women in
charge of a single-managed U.S. equity fund has hov-
ered around a very low level of about 10% over a
20-year period. Attempts to correct the underrepre-
sentation of women in the asset management indus-
try have not been successful so far (Newlands and
Ram 2016). Given that the mutual fund industry, as
a result of its steady growth and enormous size, is
a very important employer, a better understanding of
customer behavior and the eventual implications for
female workforce participation in this industry is of
great importance.
While various reasons such as hiring discrimina-
tion against women (Goldin and Rouse 2000), self-
selection of women into other professions (Polachek
1981) or into less competitive environments (Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007, Sutter and Gätzle-Rützler 2014),
and career interruptions (Bertrand et al. 2010) can help
to explain the low fraction of women in this industry,
we suggest customer-based discrimination as an alter-
native explanation for this phenomenon (Becker 1971).
Our starting point is the conjecture that at least
some customers in the mutual fund industry (i.e.,
mutual fund investors) might be subject to gender
bias, which eventually leads to lower money flows in
female-managed funds.1 Consequently, hiring women
as fund managers would be less attractive for fund
companies, as they generate their profits from fees
charged on assets under management. Using a new
mixed-methods approach, this paper presents results
from an empirical study, from an experimental invest-
ment task, and from an implicit association test (IAT)
that collectively support the idea that a significant frac-
tion of investors are subject to such a gender bias.
Our empirical investigation using field data from
all single managed U.S. equity mutual funds from
1992 to 2009 shows that female-managed funds expe-
rience significantly lower money inflows than male-
managed funds. The growth rates of female-managed
funds are more than one-third lower than those of
male-managed funds.
There are two main reasons why investors might shy
away from female fund managers: (rational) statistical
discrimination (e.g., Phelps 1972) and (irrational) prej-
udice against female fundmanagers due to gender bias
(e.g., Becker 1971). If female fund managers underper-
form or show other undesirable investment behavior,
it would be rational for investors to use the manager’s
gender as a signal of their investment skills; eventually,
they would statistically discriminate against female
fund managers by investing less in their funds. How-
ever, we find no evidence for gender differences among
fund managers that would support the view that shy-
ing away from femalemanagers could be rational: their
investment styles are more persistent over time than
those of male fund managers, while average perfor-
mance is virtually identical and male fund managers
exhibit less performance persistence. Thus, if anything,
fund investors should prefer female fund managers.
In our regressions, we control for differences in
past fund performance, fund and fund company
1
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characteristics such as size, and differences in charac-
teristics of the fund manager other than the manager’s
gender. Furthermore, to address the concern that fund
companies might assign female managers to funds that
are less attractive to fund investors for reasons that we
cannot explicitly control for, we also look at manager
changes. We find that fund flows decrease significantly
if a male manager is replaced by a female manager, but
not if a female manager is replaced by a male manager.
Additional analysis shows that our results also can-
not be explained by potentially better access of male
managers tomale-dominated institutional investor net-
works, by potential “macho-ism” of brokers who steer
investors away from female-managed funds, by preju-
dice against foreign managers, or by differences in the
extent of media coverage.
There are two possible concerns regarding our re-
sults. First, one might wonder whether fund investors
are even aware of who is managing their fund. Second,
according to the equilibrium arguments made in Berk
and Green (2004), one could argue that female man-
aged funds would underperform if they would grow
larger because of diseconomies of scale and that the
low inflows in female-managed funds could thus be
a rational equilibrium outcome. In our later discus-
sion, we address these concerns and present support-
ing evidence for our postulated gender bias channel
and against alternative explanations.
To further investigate gender bias in investment deci-
sions, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment
similar to Choi et al. (2011). Specifically, subjects in
the experiment have to decide how to split a certain
amount of money between two index funds. We chose
index funds because the ability of a fund manager to
outperform the market is irrelevant for this type of
fund. In the experiment, we keep all information about
the fund constant, except for the managers’ names
based on which subjects can infer their gender. If sub-
jects ignore the manager’s name, as they should in this
setting, we should not find any impact of gender on
the chosen investment amount. However, we observe
that subjects in our experiment invest significantly less
in a given index fund if the manager name provided
indicates a female manager. The effect is mainly driven
by male subjects, while female subjects do not seem to
be biased in either direction.
Finally, to test directly whether there is a gender bias
in finance, we conduct an IAT with the same subjects
who participated in the investment task.2 IATs are an
established experimental method regularly employed
by social psychologists to uncover prejudice based
on associations. IATs consist of computerized sorting
tasks and allow researchers to measure implicit asso-
ciations between concepts (e.g., “Science” and “Lib-
eral Arts”) and group affiliation (e.g., “Male” versus
“Female”) based on reaction times. External valida-
tions of IATs show that they are able to reliably capture
prejudice and predict behavior (e.g., Greenwald et al.
2009). We develop a new IAT to test for a potential
gender bias in finance. Results indicate a bias against
women in finance formost of the subjects in our experi-
ment. Linking the results from the IAT back to subjects’
investment behavior, we find that subjects with high
IAT prejudice scores do indeed invest significantly less
in female-managed funds in the experimental invest-
ment task, while subjects for which the IAT does not
indicate any gender bias do not invest less in these
funds.
While we cannot provide direct evidence that fund
companies consider the lower flows that have to be
expected when hiring a female fund manager, the
results from our empirical study as well as from the
experimental investment task and the IAT suggest that
this would be a plausible reaction, and thus they offer
a new customer-based explanation of why we see so
few women in the fund industry.
We also discuss why we then see any women in
this industry at all. We provide evidence consistent
with the notion that some investor groups are not
biased against women or have a preference to invest in
funds from companies that employ female fund man-
agers (e.g., because of diversity policies). Our results
show that the male-managed funds of companies that
employ at least one female manager experience higher
inflows; that is, there is a positive spillover effect of
employing female fund managers on the other funds
in the fund company.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature.
First, we relate to the general literature on gender
issues in finance. Several papers have pointed out the
low fraction of women working in the finance industry
(see, e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier 2016). However, most
of the work on gender differences among managers
has been conducted in corporate finance. For exam-
ple, Adams and Funk (2012) examine gender differ-
ences in the boardroom and find that female directors
are more benevolent and universally concerned but
less power oriented than male directors. Furthermore,
Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that female directors
have better attendance records than male directors and
are more likely to join monitoring committees. In spite
of these potential benefits to the functioning of the
board, shareholders seem to dislike the appointment
of additional women to the board of directors (Ahern
and Dittmar 2012). Evidence consistent with gender
bias among investors is also presented in Bigelow
et al. (2014). In an experimental study, they show that
initial public offerings led by female founders were
considered as less attractive investments by a group
of experimental subjects. Another strand of this lit-
erature examines the impact of gender on portfolio
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choice, highlighting that female retail investors tend to
be more risk averse and less overconfident than male
investors (e.g., Barber and Odean 2001, Agnew et al.
2003). However, to the best of our knowledge, no one
has studied in detail how customers perceive gender
in the mutual fund industry. Given the vast amounts
of money concentrated in this industry, this is surpris-
ing. According to the Investment Company Institute, of
the $16 trillion invested in U.S. mutual funds in 2016,
$7.13 trillion are held in retirement accounts.3 Results
from our experiment suggest that investors subject to
gender bias would be willing to buy a more expen-
sive index fund to avoid a female fund manager. Thus,
any bias in this particular industry, such as a gen-
der bias, may have severe long-term consequences for
many investors.
Second, our study also contributes to the large litera-
ture on the determinants of mutual fund performance
and inflows. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Baks
(2003) examine the impact of fund manager character-
istics on fund performance (without a focus on gender).
Papers on the determinants of fund flows mainly focus
on the impact of past performance (Sirri and Tufano
1998, among many others). Atkinson et al. (2003) look
at a small sample of bond funds but generally find—
with the exception of the first year a female manager
manages a fund—no impact of gender on fund flows.
Third, our findings are also relevant for the literature
on biased behavior in finance in general and of mutual
fund investors in particular. The idea that mutual fund
investors are subject to behavioral biases is examined
in Bailey et al. (2011). Furthermore, Kumar et al. (2015)
find a negative impact of foreign-sounding names on
mutual fund flows, consistent with xenophobia driv-
ing investor behavior. Our paper is, to our knowledge,
the first to show that gender bias of investors can
have an important impact on investment decisions, too.
Thus, our paper is one of the first to highlight that
not only individual behavioral biases but also social
biases—such as gender bias—play an important role
in explaining behavior. Thereby, it contributes to the
large sociopolitical debate on gender stereotyping (e.g.,
Neumark 1996, Bertrand and Hallock 2001, Newton
and Simutin 2014) by showing that gender bias is also
an issue in the financial industry.
Finally, our paper contributes to the finance litera-
ture methodologically by presenting a mixed-methods
approach. We first investigate gender bias based on
field data from the U.S. mutual fund industry and
document that female-managed funds generate sig-
nificantly lower inflows. To isolate the proposed gen-
der bias from any cofounding effects, we then run
a lab investment experiment to augment our empiri-
cal results and cross-check whether they are replica-
ble in an artificial environment. Specifically, we design
an investment task where results, if any, must be
driven by gender bias of subjects. As a third ingredi-
ent of our analysis, we introduce the IAT method to
the finance literature to directly show gender bias in
finance among subjects and to link it to investment
behavior.4 Results based on all methods come to the
same conclusions and—from a methodological point
of view—show how field and lab experiments can
fruitfully complement each other to establish a new
finding.
2. Data and Summary Statistics
Our primary data sources are the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mu-
tual Fund database as well as yearly releases of the
Morningstar Principia database and the Morningstar
Direct mutual fund database. While the first and the
latter database are survivorship bias free, each release
of the Principia database only provides a snapshot of
the cross section of funds alive at that point in time.
However, by combining yearly releases of the Prin-
cipia database, we construct a longitudinal data set
that is then also free of survivorship bias. We combine
data from CRSP and Morningstar, as the first database
contains high-quality data on fund performance while
Morningstar is considered to be more precise with
respect to manager identities and manager informa-
tion (Massa et al. 2010). The CRSP database covers vir-
tually all U.S. open-end mutual funds and provides
information on fund returns, total net assets, invest-
ment objectives, and other fund characteristics. The
Morningstar databases provide additional information
on fund management structures and individual fund
managers, including their age and education.
We focus on actively managed equity funds that in-
vestmore than 50% of their assets in stocks and exclude
bond funds, money market funds, and index funds.
This allows us to focus on a homogeneous group of
funds for which we can easily compare performance.
We aggregate the Strategic Insight and Lipper objec-
tive codes contained in the CRSP database to define the
market segment in which a fund operates. This leaves
us with 12 different equity fund segments.5 Following
Daniel et al. (1997), we aggregate all share classes of the
same fund to avoid multiple counting. Our study cov-
ers the time period from January 1992—the year from
which detailed fund information data are available in
the CRSP mutual fund database—to December 2009.
We concentrate on single-managed funds and ex-
clude all team-managed funds and funds for which
Morningstar gives multiple manager names from our
analysis. Interestingly, the fraction of female fundman-
agers in (nonanonymous) teams is clearly larger (more
than 20%) than among single-managed funds, pos-
sibly because this would be a way for fund man-
agement companies to fulfill diversity requirements
without making their female managers too salient to
Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi: Gender Bias in the Mutual Fund Industry
4 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–25, ©2018 INFORMS
investors (see Section 6.3). However, including teams
in the analysis would be problematic for at least three
reasons: First, for teams, the characteristics of each
individual team member are less important for team
outcomes and for how investors perceive that char-
acteristic. Thus, including gender-diverse teams does
not help to precisely identify potential gender bias.
We could include all-male and all-female teams, but
the fraction of the latter in particular is extremely
small, at 0.7%. Second, if fund companies really “hide”
women in teams, these companies are also less likely to
make the identities of the members of the management
team salient, for example, in their marketing material.
Third, Baer et al. (2011) show that team-managed funds
and single-managed funds behave very differently, and
Massa et al. (2010) find thatmanagement structures can
have a direct impact on flows. Thus, to obtain a clean
set of comparable funds, we decided to exclude team-
managed funds and focus on single-managed equity
funds only.
We identify fund managers’ genders based on their
first names as given in the Morningstar databases.
Managers’ first names are matched with a list of the
most popular first names by gender for the last 10
decades published by the U.S. Social Security Admin-
istration.6 Remaining names are those we could not
clearly identify as male or female (i.e., foreign names or
ambiguous names). These namesweremanually classi-
fied by asking foreign exchange students or using inter-
net sources such as fund prospectuses or press releases
that include photographs or verbal descriptions of the
managers that disclose their gender. Overall, we are
able to identify the gender of 99.39% of the fund man-
agers in our sample.
Information on the age of a fund manager; whether
a fund manager holds a bachelor’s, MBA, or PhD
degree; and whether a fund manager obtained a pro-
fessional qualification (mainly chartered financial ana-
lyst (CFA)) are collected from fund manager biogra-
phies in the Morningstar Principia and Morningstar
Direct databases, from the Capital IQ database, and
from internet searches. Data on the media coverage
of fund managers based on the number of newspa-
per articles in which a manager appears in a given
year are obtained from the LexisNexis database. Man-
ager ethnicity is determined as in Kumar et al. (2015).
A detailed description of all variables used in our later
analysis is contained in the appendix.
Our final sample contains 16,509 fund-year observa-
tions, of which 14,804 (89.67%) have a male manager
and 1,705 (10.33%) have a female manager. There are
545 (13.83%) unique female-managed funds and 3,397
(86.17%) uniquemale-managed funds. On themanager
level, there are 3,182 different managers: 2,818 (89.06%)
of them are male, and 364 (10.94%) of them are female.
The average number of uniquemale (female) managers
per year is 630 (70), and the mean (median) number
of female managers per year and fund company is
4.4 (3), conditional on the fund company offering at
least one single-managed fund any time during our
sample period. Unconditionally, the mean (median)
number of female managers per fund company and
year is 2.3 (0). These numbers show that female man-
agers are not equally distributed across fund compa-
nies. Female managers are present in 171 out of the 747
fund companies in our sample and tend to be concen-
trated in larger fund companies. The number of unique
female managers per investment style and year ranges
between 0 and 48, with a mean (median) of 13 (18).
Figure 1 plots the total number of male- and female-
managed funds as well as the fraction of female-
managed funds over our sample period. It shows that
the fraction of female-managed funds is low and con-
stant at about 10% over our whole sample period. At
the same time, data reported by the National Center
for Education Statistics show that the fraction of female
graduates receiving a bachelor’s (master’s) degreewith
a major in finance was 40% (38%) during the period
1998–2009.7 These numbers show that the fraction of
women among finance degree holders that are poten-
tially interested in a career in finance is much higher
than the actual fraction of female fund managers.
While our sample ends in December 2009, more recent
descriptive statistics provided by Morningstar show
that the fraction of female fundmanagers in the United
States did not increase in more recent years and is still
low, at about 9.4%.8
In Table 1, we report means and differences in fund
characteristics between female- and male-managed
funds in the sample used in our baseline flow regres-
sion model (column (1) in Table 2) for the most impor-
tant variables.9 The univariate comparison shows that
female-managed funds get significantly lower money
inflows than male-managed funds. Female managers
have a slightly better average performance based on
Sharpe ratios, but there is no difference in average per-
formance based on factor alphas or raw returns. They
are responsible for significantly smaller funds, while
the mean age of female-managed funds is slightly
higher than the mean age of male-managed funds.
With respect to fees, we find that 12b-1 fees are sig-
nificantly higher for female-managed funds than for
male-managed funds. We also find that female man-
agers trade significantly less than male managers, but
there is no significant gender difference in average
fund risk. Female fund managers have a significantly
lower tenure with a particular fund and are signifi-
cantly less likely than male fund managers to hold a
PhD degree. Finally, the media coverage of female fund
managers is significantly lower than that of male fund
managers: whilemale fundmanagers are coveredmore
than twice per year on average, female managers are
Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi: Gender Bias in the Mutual Fund Industry
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Figure 1. Distribution of Funds by Manager Gender
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Notes. This figure displays the total number of female- and male-managed funds (bars) and the fraction of female-managed funds (line). The
sample consists of all female and male fund managers responsible for at least one single-managed equity fund from January 1992 to December
2009. Data are taken from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database and from Morningstar.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Sample mean Female managers Male managers Difference
(N  12,301) (N  1,318) (N  10,983) (female−male)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fund flowsi , t 0.289 0.187 0.301 −0.114∗∗∗
Fund returni , t 0.042 0.050 0.041 0.009
CAPM alphaneti , t (in %) −0.057 −0.057 −0.057 0.000
Three-factor alphaneti , t (in %) −0.063 −0.062 −0.063 0.001
Four-factor alphaneti , t (in %) −0.063 −0.063 −0.063 0.000
Sharpe ratioi , t 0.193 0.277 0.183 0.094∗∗
Fund sizei , t (in millions) 969.58 779.36 992.40 −213.04∗∗
Fund agei , t (in years) 12.79 13.56 12.70 0.86∗∗
Expense ratioi , t 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.001
12b-1 feesi , t 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001∗∗∗
Turnover ratioi , t 1.016 0.914 1.028 −0.049∗∗
Fund riski , t 0.050 0.049 0.050 −0.001
Systematic riski , t 0.995 0.989 0.996 −0.006
Unsystematic riski , t 0.062 0.062 0.062 −0.000
Manager has bachelor’si , t 0.998 0.996 0.999 −0.003∗
Manager has MBAi , t 0.556 0.572 0.554 0.018
Professional qualificationi , t 0.515 0.507 0.516 −0.009
Manager has PhDi , t 0.053 0.007 0.059 −0.052∗∗∗
Manager tenurei , t (in years) 5.836 4.926 5.945 −1.019∗∗∗
Manager agei , t (in years) 46.83 44.49 47.11 −2.62∗∗∗
Foreign manageri , t 0.045 0.054 0.044 0.010
Manager’s media coveragei , t 2.088 0.995 2.219 −1.224∗∗∗
Notes. This table shows average fund andmanager characteristics for all observations entering ourmain
flow regression (column (1) in Table 2). Descriptive statistics for all pooled observations (column (1)),
for female-managed funds (column (2)), and for male-managed funds (column (3)) are presented.
The difference between the average characteristics of female- and male-managed funds is reported in
column (4). All variables are in decimals unless indicated otherwise. The respective number of fund-
year observations is displayed in the column header. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix.
Significance is calculated based on a two-sided t-test.
∗∗∗1% significance; ∗∗5% significance; ∗10% significance.
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Table 2. Manager Gender and Fund Flows
Only
Full Manager Manager Media Advertising Broker Only retail institutional
sample characteristics changes coverage channel channel investors investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female manageri , t −0.112 −0.118 −0.109 −0.115 −0.108 −0.164 −0.123(−4.00) (−3.32) (−3.89) (−3.21) (−3.68) (−4.01) (−1.22)
Female manager replaces malei , t−1 −0.139(−2.13)
Fund flowsi , t−1 0.029 0.019 0.029 0.029 0.025 0.032 0.017 0.078(3.32) (1.28) (3.31) (3.29) (2.62) (3.06) (1.32) (3.32)
Performance quintile1i , t 0.193 0.069 0.188 0.199 0.507 0.038 0.199 −0.910(0.68) (0.20) (0.66) (0.70) (1.44) (0.10) (0.58) (−1.03)
Performance quintile2–4i , t 0.381 0.359 0.381 0.379 0.434 0.475 0.384 0.382(7.53) (5.37) (7.50) (7.49) (6.47) (5.02) (5.48) (2.93)
Performance quintile5i , t 2.373 2.693 2.378 2.367 2.859 2.768 2.311 0.636(6.65) (5.33) (6.65) (6.64) (6.21) (4.85) (4.54) (0.75)
Fund sizei , t−1 −0.145 −0.145 −0.145 −0.148 −0.163 −0.211 −0.151 −0.127(−10.52) (−8.11) (−10.47) (−10.63) (−8.06) (−8.41) (−7.09) (−3.42)
Turnover ratioi , t−1 0.061 0.100 0.062 0.060 0.072 0.024 0.061 0.087(3.76) (2.09) (3.83) (3.75) (2.26) (1.24) (3.14) (0.83)
Fund riski , t−1 0.226 1.405 0.244 0.233 0.608 1.390 0.402 −3.088(0.34) (1.47) (0.36) (0.35) (0.66) (1.05) (0.52) (−1.08)
Expense ratioi , t−1 3.931 −2.426 4.015 3.830 1.115 −2.901 1.780 2.018(1.20) (−0.44) (1.23) (1.16) (0.19) (−0.38) (0.31) (1.71)
Fund agei , t−1 −0.003 −0.028 −0.003 −0.001 0.009 0.010 −0.024 −0.122(−0.16) (−1.31) (−0.15) (−0.04) (0.31) (0.27) (−0.70) (−1.74)
Segment flowi , t 0.138 0.113 0.138 0.137 0.156 0.255 0.118 0.068(3.13) (2.31) (3.13) (3.11) (2.33) (2.63) (2.13) (0.79)
Company flowi , t 0.000 −0.002 0.000 0.000 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 0.004(0.13) (−0.90) (0.09) (0.07) (−1.67) (−0.54) (−1.54) (0.78)
Manager has MBAi , t 0.020(0.58)
Professional qualificationi , t 0.054(1.45)
Manager has PhDi , t −0.026(−0.51)
Manager tenurei , t 0.013(3.90)
Manager agei , t −0.004(−1.83)
Foreign manageri , t −0.188(−3.58)
Manager changei , t−1 −0.022(−0.73)
Young manager replaces oldi , t−1 −0.055(−1.51)
Manager’s media coveragei , t−1 0.043(2.80)
mentioned less than once per year in the public press.
It is important to note, however, that media coverage
of fund managers is highly skewed, with a few man-
agers receiving abnormally highmedia coverage, while
many managers are not covered by the news media
at all.
3. Do Investors Care About the Manager’s
Gender? Empirical Evidence
3.1. Manager Gender and Fund Flows
We start our empirical analysis by examining whether
female-managed funds attract lower inflows than
male-managed funds. We relate net inflows in a fund,
Fund flowsi , t , to a dummy variable, Female manageri , t ,
that equals 1 if the manager of fund i in year t is female
and 0 otherwise. As control variables, we add several
characteristics that have proven to influence fundflows.
Specifically, we control for fund flows in the previous
year, past performance, fund size, the fund’s annual
turnover ratio, fund risk, the fund’s expense ratio, and
the fund’s age.10 We control for the nonlinear impact
of past performance on fund flows documented in
Sirri and Tufano (1998) by following their approach:
we estimate a piecewise linear regression using
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Table 2. (Continued)
Only
Full Manager Manager Media Advertising Broker Only retail institutional
sample characteristics changes coverage channel channel investors investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
12b-1 feesi , t−1 −0.156
(−1.77)
No load fundi , t−1 ×Female manageri , t 0.030
(0.45)
No load fundi , t−1 0.063
(1.50)
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.157 0.177 0.179 0.227 0.135 0.173 0.441
Observations 12,301 6,769 12,300 12,301 7,503 10,672 6,973 1,484
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. This table shows the estimates of percentage fund flows, Fund flowsi , t , regressed on a female fund manager dummy, as well as fund,
segment, and fund company characteristics. Fund flows are calculated by subtracting the internal growth of a fund due to returns earned
on assets under management from the total growth rate of the fund’s total net assets under management. Female manageri , t is a dummy
variable that takes on the value 1 if a fund i is managed by a female manager in year t and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in
the appendix. All regressions include year, segment, and fund company fixed effects. In all regressions, we control for the nonlinear impact
of past performance on fund flows. We follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) and include performance quintiles based on net return ranks of all
funds belonging to the same market segment in a given year. Column (1) reports results of our baseline regression specification. In column (2),
we additionally include demographic characteristics of fund managers as additional control variables. In column (3), we replace our female
dummy variable with a variable that is equal to 1 if a male manager at fund i is replaced by a female manager in year t−1 and 0 otherwise. We
also control for manager changes per se and additionally include a dummy variable indicating whether a younger manager replaces a manager
who is older. In column (4), we add the logarithm of a manager’s media coverage as a control variable. In column (5), we add 12b-1 fees as a
control variable. Results in columns (6)–(8) are estimated on the share class level rather than the portfolio level. In column (6), we include a
dummy variable indicating whether a share class charges front-end load and its interaction with the female dummy variable. In columns (7)
and (8), we run our baseline regression from column (1) for share classes designated to retail or institutional investors only, respectively. The
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the fund level are in parentheses. FE, fixed effects.
performance quintiles based on net return ranks of
all funds belonging to the same market segment in a
given year.11 All control variables are also defined in
more detail in the appendix. Sialm and Tham (2015)
show that the stock market performance of mutual
fund companies can impact flows of affiliated funds. To
account for the impact of this effect and other charac-
teristics of the fund company on inflows, we addition-
ally include the value-weighted average of fund flows
in the fund company in year t less the fund under con-
sideration. Factors affecting flows of new money in the
whole segment of the fund are considered by adding
the percentage of flows in the respective market seg-
ment k in year t.12
We estimate our empirical models by applying a
pooled regression approach with standard errors clus-
tered at the fund level. All regressions include time,
segment, and fund company fixed effects.13 Including
fund company and segment fixed effects also addresses
the concern that female managers might self-select into
particular types of segments or fund companies that
for some other reason attract lower inflows. Results are
presented in Table 2.
Results in column (1) show that flows in female-
managed funds are significantly lower than those
in male-managed funds. Despite the relatively low
fraction of female-managed funds, the impact of the
female manager dummy is negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The effect is also economi-
cally meaningful: the estimate for the influence of the
female manager dummy shows that, in a given year, a
female-managed fund grows by about 11.2 percentage
points less than a comparable fund that is managed
by a male fund manager. Given that the average fund
in our sample grows by about 29% per annum (see
Table 1), this means that a female-managed fund grows
by about 40% less (in relative terms) than a comparable
fund that is managed by a male fund manager.
Our findings confirm the convex performance-flow
relationship documented in, for example, Sirri and
Tufano (1998). Furthermore, our results regarding the
other control variables also generally confirm findings
from the literature.
We also conduct an extensive battery of robust-
ness checks, including the following modifications:
(i) changing control variables, (ii) using alternative
ways tomeasure fund flows, (iii) using subsample anal-
ysis and temporal stability, (iv) using alternative econo-
metric specifications, and (v) using matched sam-
ple methods. Additionally, addressing concerns that
results based on the relatively small fraction of female
managers are not merely driven by some extreme flow
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observations, instead of winsorizing at the top and bot-
tom 1%, we also winsorize this variable at the top and
bottom 5%. The details of these tests and the results are
described in Section IA-2.3 of the internet appendix. In
all cases we find a statistically significant and econom-
ically meaningful negative impact of the female man-
ager dummy, confirming that female-managed funds
receive significantly lower inflows than male-managed
funds.
3.2. Empirical Analysis of Alternative Explanations
In columns (2)–(8) of Table 2, we refine our analysis
and try to empirically disentangle alternative expla-
nations for the documented lower inflows in female-
managed funds. One potential explanation for lower
inflows in female-managed funds could be that female
and male fund managers differ with respect to other
demographic characteristics that investors might con-
sider in their investment decision. For example, results
in Table 1 show that male and female managers indeed
differ, for example, with respect to their tenure at a par-
ticular fund, their age, and the probability that they
hold a PhD degree. Thus, in column (2), we add further
control variables that capture the impact of these dif-
ferences on flows.We did not include these variables in
our baseline model because we only have information
on the demographic characteristics for a subset of fund
managers. We include dummy variables that take on
the value 1 if the manager holds a MBA degree, a PhD,
or a professional qualification (e.g., CFA), respectively,
and 0 otherwise, as well as a fund manager’s age and
tenure at the fund currently managed.14 To rule out
that our results are driven by prejudice against fund
managers with foreign names (as in Kumar et al. 2015),
we also include a dummy variable indicating whether
the fund manager has a foreign-sounding name.
We find that manager tenure has a positive impact
on fund flows, while age and education have no no-
table impact and foreign managers receive signifi-
cantly lower inflows. Most importantly, we still find
that female managers receive on average nearly 12%
lower inflows after adding these additional control
variables.15
It is also possible that investors dislike certain funds
for reasons we do not control for and that women are
more likely tomanage such funds—either because they
self-select to manage those funds or because they are
assigned to these funds by the fund company. To sep-
arate the impact of such fund characteristics from the
impact of gender on fund flows, in column (3) we look
at the impact of manager changes on fund flows. We
create a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a male
fund manager is replaced by a female fund manager
and 0 otherwise. There are 192 such cases. We also con-
trol for manager changes in general and for whether
a senior manager is replaced by a junior manager to
address concerns that differences in manager age lead
to a seniority effect, which we falsely attribute to man-
ager gender. Results show that fund flows decrease by
about 14% if a male manager is replaced by a female
manager, while a manager change per se has no sig-
nificant impact. We also find a negative flow reaction
to young managers replacing older managers, but the
coefficient is not significant at conventional levels.
Kaniel et al. (2007) show that media coverage has a
positive impact on fund flows. A similar effect is doc-
umented for fund advertising in Jain and Wu (2000),
Cronqvist (2006), and Gallaher et al. (2015). Results in
Table 1 show that the press covers male fund man-
agers significantly more often than female managers,
while 12b-1 fees (which are explicitly labeled to cover
distribution and marketing expenses) are higher for
female-managed funds. To control for the impact of
these differences, in columns (4) and (5), we add lagged
media coverage and a fund’s 12b-1 fees, respectively, as
additional control variables. We define media coverage
as the log of 1 plus the number of articles on a given
manager per year to account for the skewed nature of
this variable (see Table IA-I in the internet appendix).
Results show that gender differences in media cover-
age or advertising do not affect our main result. In line
with earlier work, we also observe a significantly posi-
tive impact of media coverage on fund flows.
There is some indirect evidence suggesting that
fund brokers might stereotype women as less com-
petent in financial matters and might thus promote
male-managed fundsmore often than female-managed
funds. For example, a survey conducted by Wang
(1994) suggests some “machismo” among brokers:
sales representatives at brokerages spend more time
advising men than women, offer a wider variety
of investments to men, and try harder to acquire
men as customers. As broker-advised funds typically
charge front-end loads, while no-load funds are usu-
ally directly distributed (Christoffersen et al. 2013), we
use the fee structure of the fund as a proxy for the
distribution channel. Most funds offer multiple share
classes that differ with respect to their fee structure
(and other characteristics). Thus, unlike the rest of our
regressions, we conduct this analysis on the share class
level rather than on the fund level. We use the same
regression setup but additionally interact our female
manager dummy with a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if the share class charges no front-end load and 0
otherwise.16 This setup helps us to rule out that bro-
kers, rather thanmutual fund investors, drive ourmain
result. Results in column (6) show no significant impact
of the interaction term, suggesting that the negative
impact of our female manager dummy onmutual fund
flows is not driven by brokers.
Another concern is that our results are not really
due to investors preferring male fund managers but
Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi: Gender Bias in the Mutual Fund Industry
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–25, ©2018 INFORMS 9
can be explained by male managers having better
access to often male-dominated networks of institu-
tional investors. Thus, we also run our regression sep-
arately on a subsample of share classes only open to
retail investors or only open to institutional investors,
respectively. Regressions are restricted to these share
classes only. Results presented in columns (7) and (8)
show that the effect of the female manager dummy is
of similar economicmagnitude and even slightly larger
among funds focusing on retail investors exclusively. It
is insignificant among institutional share classes (prob-
ably because of the small number of observations) but
significant at the 1% level among retail share classes.
These findings show that our main result is not due to
institutional investor networks.
4. Gender Bias vs. Rational Statistical
Discrimination
Results in the previous section suggest that investors
prefer male-managed funds to female-managed funds.
We propose gender bias as one possible explanation
for this finding. However, our findings could also be
driven by statistical discrimination rather than by a
gender bias. To disentangle these two explanations, we
now investigate whether there is any evidence of unde-
sirable investment behavior (see Section 4.1) or infe-
rior fund performance (see Section 4.2) of female fund
managers compared with male fund managers that
could justify investors rationally discriminating against
female managers.
4.1. Investment Styles
It is sometimes argued that gender differences are of
little importance among professionals because the sim-
ilar environment and educational background of pro-
fessionals overrides potential gender differences. How-
ever, there is also evidence that gender differences are
still relevant in professional management settings (e.g.,
Adams and Funk 2012, Graham et al. 2013).
To examine gender differences between male and
female fund managers, we relate various measures
of investment behavior to the fund manager’s gender
and other potentially relevant fund characteristics. We
focus on risk-taking behavior, trading activity, and the
variability of investment styles over time.
As dependent variables, we either use one of
three risk measures for fund i in year t—total fund
return risk (Fund riski , t), systematic return risk (Sys-
tematic riski , t), or unsystematic return risk (Unsystem-
atic riski , t)—or use the fund’s turnover ratio (Turnover
ratioi , t), all as defined in the appendix. Besides the
female manager dummy, we include lagged fund size,
the expense ratio, and fund age as control variables.
Furthermore, we include a fund’s previous year return,
the fund manager’s tenure, as well as time, segment,
and fund company fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the fund level. Panel A of Table 3 summa-
rizes our findings.
Regarding the various dimensions of risk-taking
behavior, we find negative coefficients for female-
managed funds, which is consistent with the widely
documented fact that women tend to be more risk
averse than men (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999). We also find
that women tend to trade less, which is often inter-
preted as evidence for less overconfidence (Barber and
Odean 2001). However, both effects are not statistically
significant. This result is consistent with earlier work
(see, e.g., Adams and Ragunathan 2017) showing that,
in contrast to population gender differences, gender
differences in a professional setting might be less pro-
nounced. Thus, female managers need not be more
risk averse than their male counterparts. However, the
insignificant impact of gender in this setting could also
be driven by the fact that risk can only be measured
with noise and the number of female-managed funds
is relatively low. Thus, we also report the 95% confi-
dence intervals for the coefficient estimate of the female
manager dummy. They show that any potential gen-
der differences are economically relatively small with
a high degree of confidence.
Finally, we want to examine whether there are any
differences in style variability defined as the variabil-
ity of a fund’s factor loadings over time, SVi (see the
appendix).17 We conduct only a univariate compari-
son between the style variability measures of female-
and male-managed funds because we only calculate
one style variability measure based on the entire time
span over which a specific manager manages a fund.
Results in panel B of Table 3 show that style variability
is significantly lower for female-managed funds; that
is, female fund managers follow more stable invest-
ment styles over time than male fund managers. This
finding holds for the overall style variability measure
(column (1)) as well as for the three-factor individual
style variability measures based on a fund’s loadings
on the size, value, and momentum factor (columns (2),
(3), and (4), respectively).18
Overall, we only find minor differences with respect
to the investment behavior of female and male fund
managers: female fundmanagers’ investment behavior
should be, ceteris paribus, more desirable for mutual
fund investors as they followmore stable and thus reli-
able investment styles than male fund managers.
4.2. Fund Performance and Performance
Persistence
We now examine whether the behavioral differences
documented in the previous section lead to differ-
ences in fund performance or performance persistence
between male- and female-managed funds. As indi-
vidual fund performance can only be estimated with
noise, we first analyze performance differences on the
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Table 3. Gender Differences in Investment Behavior
Panel A: Risk-taking and trading activity
Fund riski , t Systematic riski , t Unsystematic riski , t Turnover ratioi , t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female manageri , t −0.000 −0.004 −0.004 −0.020
(−0.44) (−0.31) (−1.16) (−0.62)
Fund sizei , t−1 0.001 0.023 −0.002 −0.078
(5.35) (5.30) (−1.24) (−6.31)
Expense ratioi , t−1 0.072 1.163 0.970 −0.004
(1.85) (2.59) (1.36) (−0.00)
Fund agei , t−1 −0.001 −0.015 0.001 0.030
(−3.20) (−1.87) (0.23) (1.29)
Fund returni , t−1 0.009 0.163 0.039 0.113
(5.65) (6.54) (2.58) (1.03)
Manager tenurei , t−1 −0.000 −0.006 0.000 −0.019
(−4.75) (−5.24) (0.59) (−4.42)
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.334 0.319 0.490
Observations 15,153 15,122 15,122 15,048
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund company FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
95% confidence interval [−0.00, 0.00] [−0.03, 0.02] [−1.14, 0.29] [−0.08, 0.04]
for female manageri , t
Panel B: Style variability (SVi)
SVTotali SV
SMB
i SVHMLi SV
MOM
i
Female manager 0.8748 0.8789 0.8750 0.8706
Male manager 1.0059 1.0057 1.0059 1.0061
Difference (female−male) −0.1311∗∗∗ −0.1268∗∗∗ −0.1309∗∗∗ −0.1355∗∗∗
Notes. In panel A, the dependent variable is one of the following: fund i’s total risk in year t, measured by its return time-series standard
deviation (column (1)); the fund’s systematic risk, defined as the factor loading on the market factor from the Jensen (1968) one-factor
model (column (2)); the fund’s unsystematic risk, defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from the Jensen (1968) one-factor model
(column (3)); and the fund’s annual turnover ratio (column (4)). Female manageri , t is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if fund i is
managed by a female manager in year t and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include year, segment,
and fund company fixed effects. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the fund level are in parentheses. Panel B shows
the average style variability of female-managed andmale-managed funds for the aggregate style variability measure (column (1)), as well as for
the factor individual style variability measures (columns (2)–(4)). The factor individual style variability measures are defined as the rescaled
time-series standard deviations of a fund’s yearly factor loading on the SMB, the HML, and the momentum factor from the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model. The aggregate style variability measure is defined as the average of the three-factor individual style variability measures.
Differences in style variability between female and male fund managers are given in the third line. Significance is calculated based on a
two-sided t-test. FE, fixed effects.
∗∗∗1% significance; ∗∗5% significance; ∗10% significance.
portfolio level. We evaluate the performance of a hypo-
thetical equal-weighted difference portfolio that is long
in all female-managed funds and short in all male-
managed funds. Results based on net performance are
presented in columns (1)–(3) of panel A in Table 4;
results based on gross performance are presented in
columns (4)–(6). Irrespective of whether we focus on
Jensen (1968) alphas, Fama and French (1993) three-
factor alphas, or Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas, the
difference portfolio never delivers any statistically sig-
nificant abnormal returns. In the last line of panel A,we
display the 95% confidence interval for the respective
alphas. They are relatively tight around zero, suggest-
ing that significant performance differences between
female and male managers are indeed unlikely. We
conduct a large number of robustness tests and never
find any statistically or economically significant perfor-
mance difference between male- and female-managed
funds (see Section IA-2.4 in the internet appendix).
These results suggest that the market for mutual
fund managers is efficient in the sense that it is not
possible to generate abnormal returns by following an
investment strategy based on a manager characteristic
as easily observable as the manager’s gender.
In panel B we analyze gender differences in perfor-
mance persistence. Performance persistence is defined
as the standard deviation of a manager’s performance
ranks over time.19 We investigate performance persis-
tence based on the six net and gross performance mea-
sures analyzed above. Results show that performance
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Table 4. Performance and Performance Persistence
Panel A: Fund performance—Portfolio evidence
Net performance Gross performance
CAPM f−mt Three-factor
f−m
t Four-factor
f−m
t CAPM
f−m
t Three-factor
f−m
t Four-factor
f−m
t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Performance alphat 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
(0.05) (0.71) (0.08) (0.83) (1.11) (0.37)
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.165 0.225 0.030 0.190 0.134
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216
95% confidence interval [−0.0005, 0.0005] [−0.0003, 0.0007] [−0.0005, 0.0005] [−0.0003, 0.0008] [−0.0003, 0.0010] [−0.0005, 0.0007]
for performance alphat
Panel B: Performance persistence
Female manager Male manager Difference (female−male)
CAPM alphaneti , t 0.2509 0.2663 −0.0154
Three-factor alphaneti , t 0.2486 0.2649 −0.0163∗
Four-factor alphaneti , t 0.2323 0.2581 −0.0258∗∗
CAPM alphai , t 0.2445 0.2591 −0.0146∗∗
Three-factor alphagrossi , t 0.2327 0.2565 −0.0238∗∗∗
Four-factor alphagrossi , t 0.2327 0.2553 −0.0226∗∗∗
Notes. In panel A, we show results from a regression with the equal-weighted return of a difference portfolio that is long in all female-managed
funds and short in all male-managed funds as the dependent variable. Columns (1)–(3) report net difference returns; columns (4)–(6) report
gross difference returns. To obtain performance alphas, difference returns are regressed on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) market
factor in columns (1) and (4), on the three factors of Fama and French (1993) in columns (2) and (5), and on the four factors of Carhart (1997)
in columns (3) and (6). Panel B contains the average time-series standard deviation of yearly performance ranks of female- and male-managed
funds for various performance measures and the difference between female andmale fundmanagers. The t-statistics based on robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗1% significance; ∗∗5% significance; ∗10% significance.
ranks of male-managed funds are more variable over
time than those of female-managed funds. The effect
is statistically significant for five of the six perfor-
mance measures. These findings provide some evi-
dence that the performance of female-managed funds
is more persistent than the performance of male-
managed funds. A more stable performance as well as
the more stable investment styles of female managers
documented above should, if anything, be preferable
from an investor’s point of view.
Overall, the evidence provided in this section does
not support the idea of investors rationally avoid-
ing female fund managers. Rather, it suggests that
investors might exhibit taste-based irrational behavior
leading to gender bias.
5. Do Investors Care About the Manager’s
Gender? Experimental Evidence
Although the previous sections suggest that rational
statistical discrimination and several other alternative
explanations for lower flows in female-managed funds
are unlikely to be the main driver of our results, it is, of
course, not possible to empirically observe and control
for all other potential drivers of fund flows. Thus, to
shed further light on the question of whether investors
really care about manager gender, we conduct a con-
trolled laboratory experiment to better identify a causal
impact of fund manager gender on fund flows. This
procedure also has the advantage that we can exam-
ine the impact of investor characteristics on invest-
ment decisions, while the previous empirical analy-
sis focuses on aggregate investor behavior at the fund
level.
The experiment was conducted with U.S. university
students and consists of two main parts, an investment
task (see Section 5.1) and an IAT (see Section 5.2). The
investment task allows us to analyze the impact ofman-
ager gender on capital allocations in a controlled labo-
ratory setting, and the IAT allows us to get a proxy for
gender bias on the subject level. We then link back IAT
scores to investment decisions to test whether gender
bias predicts investment behavior (see Section 5.3).20
5.1. Investment Task
We develop a simple between-subjects design in which
100 experimental currency units have to be split
between two S&P 500 index funds that we randomly
chose from the CRSP fund database beforehand. Since
index funds tracking the same index barely differ from
each other and deliver virtually identical gross perfor-
mance, they offer the cleanest setting to examine the
impact of specific variables on investment decisions
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(Choi et al. 2011). Furthermore, as index funds are not
subject to decreasing returns to scale (see Chen et al.
2004), any observed flow difference cannot be ratio-
nalized by optimal behavior in the sense of Berk and
Green (2004) (see also Section 6).
In each investment round, the complete amount of
100 experimental units has to be invested in either
one or both of the funds. Instead of providing the
funds’ real names, we labeled them “Fund A” and
“Fund B” to avoid any framing or familiarity effects. At
the beginning of each investment round, information
about both funds was displayed to subjects, and they
subsequently decided how to allocate their money to
one or both of them. To incentivize subjects to care-
fully think about their investment decision, we made
part of their compensation depend on the performance
of the portfolio they chose based on the actual returns
earned by the underlying real-world funds in the pre-
vious year (see Section IA-3.1 in the internet appendix).
Specifically, subjects were told that all funds they could
choose from in the experiment are real-world funds
but anonymized for the purpose of the experiment.
They were told that, on top of a performance-unrelated
show-up fee of USD 4, their remuneration is based
on the annual returns that the underlying real-world
funds had experienced in the previous year. On aver-
age, subjects earned USD 24.27 in the experiment.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two
groups, group X or group Y. Both groups were shown
information on the funds. However, we manipulated
the gender of the fund manager between these groups
while keeping all other information constant. Table 5
shows the information given to the two groups of sub-
jects. The only difference between both groups of sub-
jects is the first name of the fund managers: group X
observes a female fund manager for fund A and a male
fund manager for fund B, while group Y observes a
male fundmanager for fund A and a female fundman-
ager for fund B.21 This procedure allows us to attribute
any differences in investment behavior between the
two groups solely to the fund manager’s gender. How-
ever, Table 5 shows that the manager name provided is
only one piece of information among others presented
to subjects, and it is not made particularly salient. We
also did not tell subjects that the experiment is about
gender issues to avoid any influence on their behavior.
The experiment consisted of four rounds.22 Invest-
ment rounds only differed with respect to the amount
of information provided about the funds. In the first
round, information about the fund segment, the name
of the fundmanager, fund size, inception date, expense
ratio, trading activity, and top five stock holdings was
provided. In addition, we added a short text labeled
“Fund facts” with a description of the fund’s invest-
ment strategy (see Table 5). In the following three
rounds, we added additional information: an ethical
rating of the fund, a classification indicating the fund’s
riskiness, and the fund’s return over the past 12 and
24 months.
We recruited 121 students as subjects in our exper-
iment. Because of the recruiting procedure (about
50% of the announcements were made in finance
classes), most subjects (i.e., 44%) indicated “finance”
as their main field of study, followed by 12% major-
ing in “accounting,” 10% majoring in “marketing,”
and 9% majoring in “management information sys-
tems.” A smaller fraction of subjects indicated “eco-
nomics,” “engineering,” or other fields as their main
field of study. The mean age of subjects is 21.4, and
the gender distribution is roughly balanced, with 63
male and 58 female subjects. More details on subject
characteristics are provided in Table IA-IV in the inter-
net appendix. Results from the investment task are
reported in Table 6.
In our setting, we compare differences in the amount
invested in fund A between group X (which observed
a female manager of fund A) and group Y (which
observed a male manager of fund A) to isolate the
impact of the fund manager’s gender on investment
behavior. Panel A presents pooled results based on all
four rounds in the first row. Strictly speaking, only the
first round of investment decisions can be considered
to be completely independent in an experiment such
as ours, where subsequent rounds involve investment
choices regarding the same pair of funds. Thus, in the
second row we focus on the first round of the experi-
ment only.
In both cases, results show that subjects generally
invest less in fund A compared with fund B (i.e., in
both groups the fraction invested is below 50%), which
might be due to fund A’s higher expense ratio (see
Table 5). However, although fees should be the only
consideration in choosing between index funds, and
the whole amount should be invested in the cheaper
fund, we find that subjects invest significant amounts
in both funds. This finding confirms results from a sim-
ilar experiment reported in Choi et al. (2011).
More important in our context, subjects invest sig-
nificantly less in fund A if it is managed by a female
fund manager than if it is managed by a male fund
manager.23 The difference is 7.42 experimental units, or
roughly 15%, and is significant at the 5% level if we
pool observations from all rounds and cluster standard
errors at the subject level. It is even larger (8.51 experi-
mental units) and still significant at the 5% level if we
only focus on the first round of investment decisions.
In the following panels, we split up observations
by various subject characteristics. To prevent samples
from getting too small, we focus on results based
on observations from all rounds and again cluster
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Table 5. Investment Task
Panel A: Group X
Fund A Fund B
Fund segment S&P 500 index fund S&P 500 index fund
Fund manager Linda Williams James Davis
About the fund
Size $77.49 million $75.35 million
Inception date 10/2/1998 2/18/2005
Annual expense ratio 0.70% 0.64%
Trading activity (annual turnover ratio) 1.98% 2.03%
Fund facts The investment seeks to replicate the total
return of the S&P 500 index, before fees
and expenses. The fund invests primarily
in common stocks issued by companies in
the S&P 500 Composite Stock Price index.
The investment seeks to replicate the total
return of the S&P 500 index, before fees
and expenses. The fund invests primarily
in common stocks issued by companies in
the S&P 500 Composite Stock Price index.
Top five stock holdings
1 Exxon Mobil Corporation Exxon Mobil Corporation
2 General Electric General Electric
3 Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Corporation
4 Chevron Corporation Chevron Corporation
5 AT&T Inc. AT&T Inc.
Panel B: Group Y
Fund A Fund B
Fund segment S&P 500 index fund S&P 500 index fund
Fund manager James Williams Linda Davis
About the fund
Size $77.49 million $75.35 million
Inception date 10/2/1998 2/18/2005
Annual expense ratio 0.70% 0.64%
Trading activity (annual turnover ratio) 1.98% 2.03%
Fund facts The investment seeks to replicate the total
return of the S&P 500 index before fees
and expenses. The fund invests primarily
in common stocks issued by companies in
the S&P 500 Composite Stock Price index.
The investment seeks to replicate the total
return of the S&P 500 index before fees
and expenses. The fund invests primarily
in common stocks issued by companies in
the S&P 500 Composite Stock Price index.
Top five stock holdings
1 Exxon Mobil Corporation Exxon Mobil Corporation
2 General Electric General Electric
3 Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Corporation
4 Chevron Corporation Chevron Corporation
5 AT&T Inc. AT&T Inc.
Notes. This table displays the information about each fund provided to group X (panel A) and group Y (panel B). Identical information is
provided to both groups except for the gender of the fund manager (indicated by the first name), which is switched between fund A and
fund B.
standard errors at the subject level. In panel B, we
split up subjects by gender. Results show that the
difference in investing in female- and male-managed
funds is mainly driven by male subjects. We find
no significant difference in the fraction of money
invested between male- and female-managed funds
among female subjects. Panel C shows that the bias
toward male-managed funds is independent of sub-
jects’ main field of study. Panel D splits the subject
pool by financial literacy. We observe significantly less
money directed toward the female-managed fund in
both groups, but the effect is stronger among the more
financially literate. Furthermore, as one would hope,
more financial literate subjects seem to be more sensi-
tive to fund fees.
Overall, our experimental evidence confirms the
empirical evidence from Section 3. As all other poten-
tial drivers of fund flows are controlled for in this set-
ting, these results suggest that our previous empirical
findings are indeed due to the managers’ gender and
support our conjecture of investors preferring male-
managed funds.
5.2. Implicit Association Test
In the second part of the experiment, we conducted an
IAT to directly test for gender bias in the laboratory.
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Table 6. Investment Decisions
% invested in fund A if Difference
Female manager Male manager (female−male) Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All subjects
All rounds 41.43 48.85 −7.42∗∗ 484
First round only 34.34 42.85 −8.51∗∗ 121
Panel B: Gender
Males 35.77 46.23 −10.47∗ 252
Females 50.56 51.31 −0.75 232
Panel C: Field of study
Finance/economics 36.74 46.48 −9.74∗∗ 240
Marketing/management 44.36 53.98 −9.62∗ 84
Panel D: Financial literacy
Financial literacy ≥ 4 36.19 44.63 −8.43∗ 220
Financial literacy < 4 47.42 52.33 −4.92 116
Notes. This table shows the fraction of money invested in fund A if it is female managed (column (1))
or male managed (column (2)) in our experiment. The difference between the amounts invested in the
female- and male-managed fund is displayed in column (3). The number of observations is provided
in column (4). Panel A presents results for all experimental subjects pooled over all investment rounds
(“All rounds” row) and only for the first round (“First round only” row). Panel B contains results for
female and male subjects separately. In panel C, we form subsamples of subjects by field of study. In
panel D, we divide subjects based on their financial literacy. Financial literacy is computed based on
the number of correct answers in a standard financial literacy test containing six questions on financial
issues. Results in panels B–D are based on all investment rounds. In all regressions where multiple
rounds of choices per subject are included, standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
∗∗∗1% significance; ∗∗5% significance; ∗10% significance.
To avoid the IAT’s obvious focus on gender issues pos-
sibly biasing subjects’ investment decisions, we let sub-
jects do the IAT after the investment task.
The IAT has gained enormous popularity among
social psychologists in recent years and is said
to uncover prejudice based on simple associations.
According to Lane et al. (2007), there are nowwell over
200 papers that use this method. In previous applica-
tions, the IAT is used to uncover various social biases
such as prejudice against different races, religions, gen-
ders, or sexual orientations. The test’s popularity is
based on the fact that it can be easily administered
and that it allows one to also uncover implicit preju-
dice that subjects are often not willing to admit openly
because of social desirability concerns: even if complete
anonymity is credibly guaranteed, respondents often
do not answer questions on, for example, racism or sex-
ism, truthfully in standard surveys. The IAT provides
a simple way to measure prejudice based on automati-
cally operating implicit associations that cannot be eas-
ily manipulated and might even operate completely
unconsciously (Greenwald et al. 2002). Its reliability
and validity has been confirmed by showing that IAT
scores predict biased behavior in many contexts, such
as voting behavior or brand choices (Cunningham et al.
2001, Greenwald et al. 2009).24
As IAT tests are not used in the finance literature
so far, we first shortly describe how a typical gender
IAT works: Subjects are required to classify items into
one of four categories (e.g., “Male” or “Female” and
“Science” or “Liberal Arts”) in a computerized double-
sorting task. Two of the four categories are displayed
on the left side of the screen, while the other two
are displayed on the right side of the screen. In the
“stereotypical” or compatible configuration, “Male”
and “Science” would be displayed together on one side
and “Female” and “Liberal Arts” would be displayed
together on the other side; in the incompatible con-
figuration, one of the categories is switched from one
side of the screen to the other (e.g., “Female” and “Sci-
ence” would be displayed on the same side). Subjects
have to rapidly sort items appearing in the middle of
the screen that clearly belong to one of the four cate-
gories by hitting either a left- or a right-hand key. The
IAT measures reaction times in the two configurations.
The test relies on the fact that stronger associations
(e.g., “Male” with “Science”) result in faster reaction
times than weaker associations (e.g., “Female” with
“Science”) and that the strength of associations serves
as a proxy for implicit prejudice. If there is no implicit
prejudice, average reaction times should be identical.
By contrast, if there is a biased perception that, for
example, men are more skilled in science and women
are more skilled in liberal arts, reaction times would be
higher in the incompatible configuration.
To examine whether there is any evidence of gen-
der bias in our setting, we adapt the IAT to the context
of finance. The first category we use is “Male” versus
Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi: Gender Bias in the Mutual Fund Industry
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–25, ©2018 INFORMS 15
Table 7. Items Used in the IAT
Panel A: Gender items
Female Male
MOTHER FATHER
DAUGHTER SON
GIRL BOY
AUNT UNCLE
GRANDMA GRANDPA
SISTER BROTHER
Panel B: Field items
Finance Marketing
STOCKS ADVERTISEMENT
DERIVATIVE PRODUCT PLACEMENT
MUTUAL FUNDS MERCHANDISING
STOCK EXCHANGE SALES PROMOTION
CORPORATE BOND BRANDING
MORTGAGE CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
INTEREST RATE LOGO
INVESTMENT CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
Notes. This table shows the list of items used in the IAT test. Panel A
contains all items used in the gender categories (“Female” and
“Male”). Panel B contains all items used in the field categories
(“Finance” and “Marketing”).
“Female.” The words belonging to the gender cate-
gories are taken from typical gender IATs similar to the
one described above. They are all easily recognizable
as belonging to the female ormale category—for exam-
ple, “father,” “uncle,” “mother,” or “aunt.” The full list
of items is presented in panel A of Table 7. The sec-
ond category we use is “Finance” and “Marketing.”We
chose “Marketing” as the contrasting category because
finance and marketing are two of the most prominent
majors among U.S. undergraduate students in busi-
ness administration. The items that have to be sorted
into these categories are again easily recognizable and
include “stocks,” “mutual funds,” “advertising,” and
“logo.” The full list of items is presented in panel B
of Table 7. Subjects have to categorize items by hitting
the “E” or “I” key on their keyboards, depending on
whether the specific item displayed on the center of the
screen belongs to a category displayed on the left- or
right-hand side of the screen. An example is provided
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. (Color online) IAT Screen
Marketing
or Female
Panel A: Compatible configuration Panel B: Incompatible configuration
Marketing
or Male
Finance
or Female
stocksstocks
Finance
or Male
Note. This figure displays the compatible configuration of the IAT (panel A) and the incompatible configuration (panel B).
Panel A displays the compatible configurationwhere
the categories “Finance” and “Male” are on one side
of the screen and “Marketing” and “Female” are on
the other side. By contrast, panel B displays the incom-
patible configuration. In the first (second) case of the
example shown in Figure 2, subjects had to sort the
item “stocks” into the left (right) category as fast as
possible. If their average reaction time is significantly
higher in the incompatible configuration than in the
compatible configuration, this indicates that they are
more biased. The test was administered in two ver-
sions, and subjects were randomly assigned to one of
the versions. Subjects assigned to the first version of the
test started with the compatible configuration followed
by the incompatible configuration, and vice versa for
subjects assigned to the second version. After several
practice rounds, in which subjects could get familiar
with the sorting task, we started measuring their reac-
tion times.
The simplest way to compute IAT scores is to just
compare reaction times in milliseconds, which we
denote by R. The reaction times for both groups in
the compatible and the incompatible configurations
are summarized in box plots presented in Figure 3.25
Panel A (panel B) reports results for subjects who
first played the compatible (incompatible) configura-
tion and then the incompatible (compatible) configu-
ration. In both cases, reaction times are lower in the
compatible than in the incompatible configuration. In
panel A (panel B), the mean reaction time for the com-
patible configuration is 758.97 ms (832.71 ms), while it
is 925.77 ms (1,002.70 ms) in the incompatible config-
uration. To examine reaction times more formally, we
aggregate data on the subject level and calculate the
average reaction time R in millseconds. We then com-
pute the IAT score as the difference in the mean reac-
tion time between the compatible and the incompati-
ble configuration based on R for each subject j, which
we denote by d(R) j .26 Independent of the configura-
tion a subject plays first, we always subtract the mean
reaction time in the compatible configuration from the
reaction time in the incompatible configuration. Thus,
if d is significantly larger than zero, this suggests the
existence of a gender bias.
Results for a pooled examination of all subjects are
presented in Table 8. The mean of d(R) across all
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Figure 3. (Color online) Reaction Times in IAT
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Incompatible configuration Compatible configuration
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1,500
2,000
R
Compatible configuration Incompatible configuration
Panel A: Compatible configuration first Panel B: Incompatible configuration first
Notes. This figure shows box plots for the reaction times, R, in milliseconds for the group playing the compatible configuration first (panel A)
and the group playing the incompatible configuration first (panel B). The horizontal line in the box indicates the median level, and the upper
and lower hinges represent the 75th and 25th percentiles, respectively. The length of the whiskers is determined by the adjacent value, which is
still just inside a limit determined by 1.5 times the interquartile range. Extremely low (high) reaction times of below 300 ms (above 3 seconds)
are set equal to 300 ms (3 seconds).
subjects is 174.66 ms—that is, the average of the sub-
ject mean reaction times in the incompatible config-
uration is about 20% higher than in the compatible
configuration. The hypothesis that the IAT score is not
different from zero can be rejected at the 1% level
(t-statistic > 11). The 95% confidence interval for d(R)
is shown in column (3). In the last four columns,
we present the number and percentage of subjects
for which the respective d measure is (at least at the
10% level) significantly negative, negative, positive,
and (at least at the 10% level) significantly positive,
respectively, on an individual level. Nearly 62% of the
subjects show a significantly positive d even on an indi-
vidual level. Only about 4% exhibit a significantly neg-
ative d. When we focus on subjects that played the
compatible (incompatible) configuration first, results
presented in row 2 (row 3) are very similar. These find-
ings provide evidence that most of our subjects indeed
show signs of gender bias in a financial context.
We also investigate which subject characteristics are
related to the strength of gender bias. We first compare
Table 8. IAT Reaction Time Differences
Mean d(R) t-stat. 95% CI sign. <0 <0 >0 sign. >0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All subjects 174.66 11.06 [143.40; 205.93] 5 (4.13%) 12 (9.92%) 29 (23.97%) 75 (61.98%)
Compatible configuration first 172.10 7.75 [127.69; 216.51] 5 (8.48%) 3 (5.08%) 13 (22.03%) 38 (64.41%)
Incompatible configuration first 177.10 7.82 [131.87; 222.33] 0 (0.00%) 9 (15.25%) 16 (27.12%) 37 (62.71%)
Notes. This table displays differences in reaction times from the IAT. The first row contains results for all subjects in our experiment. The second
(third) row contains results for the group that played the compatible configuration (incompatible configuration) first. The implicit prejudice
score is denoted by d(R), which is the difference in the average reaction times R between the incompatible and the compatible configuration in
milliseconds. Columns (2) and (3) present t-statistics and the 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the average d measures aggregated at the subject
level. Columns (4)–(7) contain the number and percentage of subjects for which the average reaction time in the incompatible configuration
is significantly smaller (sign. <0), smaller (<0), larger (>0), and significantly larger (sign. >0) than in the compatible configuration on the
individual subject level.
male and female subjects. Results are presented in
panel A of Table 9 and show significant reaction time
differences among both groups. Tajfel (1970) provides
evidence for an in-group bias of individuals, and we
thus except prejudice against women in finance to be
less pronounced or absent among female finance stu-
dents. In panel B, we find that the 31 male subjects that
study finance show an average difference in reaction
times of 242 ms, which is clearly larger than the typi-
cally observed effect of about 175 ms in the overall sub-
ject population. By contrast, among the 22 female sub-
jects who study finance, the difference amounts to only
127 ms. Interestingly, this effect is still significant at the
5% level, but it is only about half the size of the effect
observed among male finance students. Moreover, the
difference betweenmale and female finance students is
also statistically significant (t-statistic 2.18).
Finally, in panel C we check whether there is any
relation between the level of financial literacy and the
IAT score. The average IAT score in the high finan-
cial literacy group is 193 ms versus 159 ms in the low
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Table 9. Impact of Subject Characteristics on IAT Score
Mean Standard
Observations d(R) deviation Minimum Maximum t-stat. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Gender
Female subjects 58 172.75 193.19 −215.35 760.15 6.81 0.0000
Male subjects 63 176.42 155.15 −107.85 661.38 9.03 0.0000
Panel B: Female and male finance students
Female finance students 22 127.02 234.02 −215.35 760.15 2.55 0.0188
Male finance students 31 242.05 149.89 −66.80 661.38 8.99 0.0000
Panel C: Financial literacy
High literacy 55 193.23 194.15 −203.30 760.15 7.38 0.0000
Low literacy 66 159.20 154.42 −107.85 485.90 8.38 0.0000
Notes. This table displays differences in reaction times from the IAT for different subsamples. Panel A contains results for
subsamples of female and male subjects in our experiment. Panel B contains results for subsamples of female and male finance
students. Panel C contains results for subjects with high and low financial literacy. Note that d(R) denotes the difference in the
average reaction times R between the incompatible and the compatible configuration in milliseconds.
financial literacy group, but the difference is not statis-
tically significant.
Results in experiments often crucially depend on the
experimental procedure. Thus, we also test whether
the results are stable against variations of the exper-
imental parameters. In Table IA-VI in the internet
appendix we checkwhether results depend on the gen-
der of the instructor in the experiment, on the time of
the day (Folkard 1976), or on differences in the num-
ber of subjects per session (i.e., the crowdedness of the
sessions; Paulus et al. 1976). Our results are unaffected
by differences in these parameters.
5.3. Impact of Investor-Level IAT Scores on
Investment Decisions
Overall, the results from the IAT are consistent with
the view that there is gender bias in finance. However,
it is unclear whether this bias affects investment behav-
ior and is strong enough to eventually result in lower
flows in female-managed funds. Thus, we now com-
pare the fraction invested in female-managed funds in
the investment task of the experiment between subjects
with a strong gender bias to subjects with no or even
a reverse gender bias according to their respective IAT
scores. Results are presented in Table 10.
Panel A shows the mean amounts invested in the
male- and female-managed index funds over all rounds
separating between subjects with high and low IAT
scores. The results show that subjects with high IAT
scores (d(R) > 0) invest significantly less in female-
managed funds. By contrast, we find (insignificantly)
larger investments in female-managed funds of those
subjects with negative IAT scores.
In panel B, we present multivariate evidence from
a censored Tobit regression with the fraction of exper-
imental units invested in index fund A—which can
either have a male manager (group X) or a female man-
ager (group Y)—by subject j as dependent variable. As
independent variables, we include a female manager
dummy that takes on the value 1 if fund A as pre-
sented to subject j is managed by a female manager
and 0 otherwise, as well as a set of control variables.
We include (but do not explicitly report for the sake
of brevity) dummies that take on the value 1 if sub-
ject j has an above-median IAT score, is female, stud-
ies finance or economics, or has above-median financial
literacy. Regressions are estimated with session fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
Results in column (1) confirm our earlier empirical
results from Table 6 and show that fund A receives
9.5 experimental units or nearly 20% less if a female
manager is displayed to the subject. In column (2) we
interact the female manager dummy with a dummy
equal to 1 if a subject showed above-median IAT
scores and 0 otherwise. The interaction term is sig-
nificantly negative. The coefficient indicates that sub-
jects with above-median IAT scores on average allocate
17.3 experimental units less to fund A if it is managed
by a female manager compared with the base case. The
linear impact of the female manager dummy itself is
now insignificant. This result confirms our univariate
finding from panel A.
In column (3), we add an interaction term between
the female manager dummy and the female subject
dummy. The coefficient on the interaction term is pos-
itive and nearly as large as the impact of the female
manager dummy itself. This confirms our earlier find-
ings from panel B in Table 6 and shows that the neg-
ative impact of a female manager is neutralized if the
subject making the investment decision is female. In
columns (4) and (5) we interact the female manager
dummywith a dummy for finance/economics students
and with a dummy for high financial literacy, respec-
tively. None of these interaction terms is significant.
Overall, the results from the experiment suggest that
many individuals are subject to gender bias against
women in finance based on their IAT scores and
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Table 10. Investment Decision Depending on IAT Score
Panel A: % invested in fund A—Univariate evidence
Female Male Difference
manager manager (female−male) t-stat. Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
d(R) > 0 41.51 49.58 −8.06 −2.23 428
d(R) < 0 49.04 43.90 5.13 0.08 56
Panel B: % invested in fund A—Multivariate evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female managerfund A −9.464 4.370 −15.894 −8.743 −7.454
(−2.24) (0.47) (−2.21) (−1.81) (−1.46)
Female managerfund A ×Subject IAT score j −17.283
(−1.94)
Female managerfund A ×Female subject j 13.376
(1.82)
Female managerfund A ×FinEcon j −1.862
(−0.24)
Female managerfund A ×High literacy j −4.492
(−0.52)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018
Observations 484 484 484 484 484
Notes. Panel A of this table shows the amount invested in female- and male-managed funds in the investment task depending on whether
subjects exhibit (or do not exhibit) prejudice against females in finance in the IAT. If d(R)> 0, a subject is prejudiced against females in finance,
and vice versa. Panel B of this table shows results from a censored Tobit regression with session fixed effects, where the fraction of money
invested by subject j into index fund A is the dependent variable. Female managerfund A is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if fund A
is managed by a female fund manager and 0 otherwise. All other control variables are described in the appendix. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level. FE, fixed effects.
that this bias has a very strong impact on investment
decisions.
6. Discussion and Equilibrium
Implications
In this section, we discuss some potential remaining
concerns regarding our results as well as the equilib-
rium implications of our findings. First, we address
the concern that investors might not even know who
the fund manager is (see Section 6.1). Second, in Sec-
tion 6.2, we discuss whether our results could be con-
sistent with a rational equilibrium as described in Berk
and Green (2004). Finally, we turn to the question of
why we see any women in the mutual fund industry
at all, given that they attract significantly lower inflows
(see Section 6.3).
6.1. Do Investors Know Who Manages Their Fund?
One might be concerned about whether fund investors
are aware of who is managing the funds they invest
in. First, it is important to note that it does not matter
so much for our analysis whether investors remem-
ber who manages their fund at a later point in time.
It is only important that investors are exposed to the
identity of the manager when they make their invest-
ment decision. The literature on social categorization
processes has shown that social biases are automati-
cally activated by themere presence of a stimulus.With
respect to gender as a social category, several papers
have shown that exposure to information about gender,
as conveyed through names, pictures, or gender stereo-
typical words, can exert an unconscious influence on
individual decision making (Banaji and Greenwald
1995, Blair and Banaji 1996). Thus, even if mutual fund
investment decisions do not consciously rely on the
gender of a fund manager, they can be influenced by
investors’ perception of the manager’s name, particu-
larly if the name evokes any unconscious stereotypes
or other emotional responses.
Second, we can show that information on the fund
manager is usually easily available to investors: We col-
lect fund information for the largest single-managed
fund of the 50 largest fund companies in our sam-
ple. Of these funds, 98% report the fund manager’s
name online on their web page as well as in the official
prospectus.27 Furthermore, besides prospectuses and
fund company websites, many investors rely on finan-
cial websites such as, for example, Yahoo Finance to
gather fund information. Information on the gender of
the fundmanager is salient to investors on these pages,
as it can typically be easily inferred from the first name
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of the fundmanager, which is usually prominently pre-
sented on the first page that appears.28
Additional evidence that investors are often directly
exposed to manager names comes from product de-
scriptions in personal finance magazines. For example,
Kiplinger—one of the leading personal finance maga-
zines in the United States—featured a top 25 list of
funds, the KIP 25, on its web page. For many funds,
a short feature article appears if investors click on the
fund name. For example, there were articles available
for 11 of the 15 U.S. equity funds contained in the list
(in November 2011). Of those 11 articles, 8 mentioned
the name of the fundmanager in the very first sentence.
Finally, evidence that fund managers’ identities mat-
ter for investment decisions of mutual fund investors
is also provided in earlier empirical papers on mutual
fund flows. For example, Massa et al. (2010) show that
funds have greater inflows if the name of the fund
manager is declared compared with funds where the
manager name is kept anonymous. They also show that
departures of named managers reduce inflows. Fur-
thermore, Kumar et al. (2015) show that fund investors
shy away from funds with managers with foreign-
sounding names. These results suggest that a suffi-
ciently large fraction of investors takes the manager’s
name into account.
From the evidence provided in this section, we con-
clude that manager information is generally available
to investors and that investors are often exposed to and
take into account fund manager names when making
investment decisions.
6.2. Lower Inflows in a Rational Equilibrium?
Berk and Green (2004) show theoretically that the
observed performance of all fund managers is identi-
cal in equilibrium even if their skill levels differ. The
reason for this result is that they assume that fund
managers’ investment skills are subject to decreasing
returns to scale. If there is competitive provision of
capital by investors in the form of money inflows, this
leads to an equilibrium where all funds grew to a size
at which they are not able to outperform any longer.
In a perfect Berk and Green (2004) world, investors
might rationally predict that female fund managers
would underperform if they received larger inflows.
Thus, they provide less capital to female fund man-
agers. However, recent empirical evidence questions
the underlying assumption of the Berk and Green
(2004) model that there are strong diseconomies of
scale in the fund industry (see Reuter and Zitzewitz
2015). Furthermore, our results obtained from the con-
trolled laboratory experiment in Section 5.1 clearly
cannot be explained by the Berk and Green (2004)
model: the findings reported there are based on invest-
ment decisions between a female- and amale-managed
index fund. One reason why we focused on index
funds is that the ability of the manager to outper-
form the market is irrelevant for this type of fund. In
addition, Chen et al. (2004) argue that diseconomies
of scale are not important for index funds. Conse-
quently, the Berk and Green (2004) equilibrium argu-
ment is not relevant in this context. We conclude that
it is unlikely that the flow effects we document using
field data and particularly the experimental evidence
can be explained as a rational equilibrium response of
investors as described in Berk and Green (2004).29
6.3. Why Not Even Fewer Female Fund Managers?
One provocative question that one may ask based on
our findings is why we observe any female fund man-
agers at all. One could argue that it is suboptimal
for fund management companies to employ female
fund managers at all if they attract lower inflows than
male managers. However, while our results show that
investors on average shy away from female-managed
funds, this does not mean that all investors behave like
this.
Results from the experimental investment task show
that there is indeed a minority of subjects (typically
women) who are not biased against female fund man-
agers or even invest more with them. Therefore, it
can still make sense from the fund company’s point
of view to hire female fund managers to specifically
cater to this group of investors.30 Furthermore, many
institutional investors require their business partners
to report explicitly on their diversity policy. In a simi-
lar vein, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act requires federal agencies to do
business only with firms that “ensure . . . the fair inclu-
sion of women” and that give “consideration to the
diversity of the applicant” (Dodd–Frank Financial Reg-
ulation Bill Section 342(c)(2)). For mutual fund compa-
nies to win mandates from such clients, it is necessary
to employ at least some female fund managers.
However, most regulations and diversity policies of
institutional investors do not prescribe them to directly
invest in female-managed funds. Rather, they typi-
cally only have to make sure that the companies they
do business with have some diversity policy in place.
Thus, it could be the case that fund companies employ
some female managers to formally fulfill the requests
of such investors. However, these investors might still
not invest in the female-managed funds, but rather in
the other funds of the company. Then, female fund
managers would not directly attract flows in their own
funds, but their presence in the company would lead
to positive spillover effects for the other funds of the
company.
To test this idea, we adapt the flow regression from
column (1) in Table 2 to capture such potential spillover
effects and run the regression for male-managed funds
only. Results are presented in Table 11. In column (1),
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Table 11. Spillover Effects of Female Managers
Any Number of Both
female females variables
(1) (2) (3)
Any female manager 0.079 0.068
in companyi , t (3.34) (2.59)
Number of female managers 0.006 0.002
in companyi , t (2.48) (0.79)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.097 0.098
Observations 11,002 11,002 11,002
Notes. In this table, we use the same baseline specification as in col-
umn (1) of Table 2. In column (1), we replace our female dummy,
Female manageri , t , with a variable that is equal to 1 if there is any
female fund manager working in the fund company of fund i in
year t and 0 otherwise. In column (2), we replace our female dummy,
Female manageri , t , with a variable that is equal to the number of
female fund managers in the fund company of fund i in year t. In
column (3), we include both variables at the same time. The regres-
sions are based on male-managed funds only. They are estimated
with time and segment fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the fund level.
we replace the female manager dummy by a dummy
variable taking on the value 1 if there is any female-
managed fund among the single-managed funds of the
same fund company and 0 otherwise.31 In column (2),
instead of the dummy variable, we use the number
of female-managed funds in the same company as
the independent variable.32 In both cases, we find a
highly significant positive impact of the spillover vari-
able. For example, the coefficient in column (1) indi-
cates that male-managed funds grow by nearly eight
percentage points per annum more if the fund com-
pany also employs at least one female manager. This
seems like a large impact and gives rise to the question
of whether fund companies should not employ more
female managers in order to profit from these large
indirect positive flow effects. However, in column (3),
we present results where we include both spillover
variables simultaneously. We find a highly significant
impact of the variable indicating the presence of at least
one female-managed fund, while the number of female
managers now is insignificant; that is, there seems to be
no additional benefit of adding more female managers
if there is already at least one female-managed fund in
the company.
Overall, our results from Table 11 are consistent
with the argument that fund companies should at least
employ some female fund managers despite the lower
inflows they generate because of the demand from cer-
tain investor groups requiring them to document the
inclusion of women. The observed fraction of female
fund managers in the industry could thus be an equi-
librium outcome in the sense that the negative direct
flow effect of having a female-managed fund is offset
by the positive spillover effects on flows in other funds
offered by the fund company.
7. Conclusion
This paper uses a novel mixed-methods approach to
examine the conjecture that mutual fund investors
exhibit gender bias and prefer to invest in male-
managed funds. Consistent with this conjecture, we
find evidence that mutual fund investors direct sig-
nificantly less money in female-managed funds. We
are able to replicate this finding under the controlled
conditions of a laboratory experiment and can reject
several alternative explanations for lower inflows in
female-managed funds. Furthermore, we find that
female fund managers follow more reliable investment
styles, and we document that average performance is
identical between male and female fund managers,
while the performance of female managers is more sta-
ble than that of male managers. These results provide
no support for the notion that the lower inflows in
female-managed funds might be due to rational sta-
tistical discrimination of investors. Rather, our results
from an implicit association test suggest that there is a
gender bias among most of the subjects participating
in our experiment. Subjects with the strongest gender
bias (according to the IAT) invest the least in female-
managed funds.
Overall, our findings show that gender bias of in-
vestors can have a strong impact on financial markets
and help to clarify why female-managed funds receive
much lower inflows than male-managed funds. Fur-
thermore, as managers generating low inflows are not
attractive for fund companies to hire, our results also
suggest customer-based discrimination as a possible
new explanation for the low fraction of female man-
agers in the mutual fund industry.
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Appendix. Brief Definitions and Data Sources of Main Variables
Variable name Description Source
Panel A: Fund characteristics
Fund flowsi , t Computed as (TNAi , t −TNAi , t−1 · (1+Fund returni , t))/TNAi , t−1, where TNAi , t
denotes fund i’s total net assets in year t and Fund returni , t denotes fund i’s
return in year t. Flows are winsorized at the top 99% and bottom 1%.
CRSP, EST
Female manageri , t Dummy variable equal to 1 if fund i is managed by a woman in year t and
0 otherwise.
MSD
Fund returni , t A fund’s annual raw net return. CRSP
CAPM alphaneti , t Jensen (1968) one-factor alpha. We use three years of monthly returns after fees
first to compute factor loadings and then use the last 12 months of realized
fund and factor return data in this period to compute alphas.
CRSP, KF, EST
Three-factor
alphaneti , t
Fama and French (1993) three-factor alpha. We use three years of monthly returns
after fees first to compute factor loadings and then use the last 12 months of
realized fund and factor return data in this period to compute alphas.
CRSP, KF, EST
Four-factor alphaneti , t Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha. We use three years of monthly returns after fees
first to compute factor loadings and then use the last 12 months of realized
fund and factor return data in this period to compute alphas.
CRSP, KF, EST
CAPM alphagrossi , t Jensen (1968) one-factor alpha. We use three years of monthly returns before fees
first to compute factor loadings and then use the last 12 months of realized
fund and factor return data in this period to compute alphas.
CRSP, KF, EST
Three-factor
alphagrossi , t
Fama and French (1993) three-factor alpha. We use three years of monthly returns
before fees first to compute factor loadings and then use the last 12 months of
realized fund and factor return data in this period to compute alphas.
CRSP, KF, EST
Four-factor
alphagrossi , t
Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha. We use three years of monthly returns before
fees first to compute factor loadings and then use the last 12 months of realized
fund and factor return data in this period to compute alphas.
CRSP, KF, EST
Sharpe ratioi , t Sharpe ratio computed as a fund’s annual excess return over the risk-free rate
divided by the annualized return standard deviation based on monthly return
data.
CRSP, EST
Performance ranki , t Performance rank of a fund based on its annual return relative to the other funds
in its market segment in a given year. This variable is normalized to be between
0 and 1. The best fund is assigned a rank of 1.
CRSP, EST
Performance
quintile1i , t
Piecewise linear regression (PLR) variable, computed as min(Performance
ranki , t ; 0.2).
CRSP, EST
Performance
quintile2–4i , t
PLR variable, computed as min(Performance ranki , t −Performance quintile1i , t ; 0.8). CRSP, EST
Performance
quintile5i , t
PLR variable, computed as min(Performance ranki , t − (Performance quintile1i , t +
Performance quintile2–4i , t)).
CRSP, EST
Fund sizei , t Logarithm of a fund’s total net assets (plus 1), ln(TNAi , t+1). CRSP, EST
Fund agei , t Logarithm of fund i’s age in years (plus 1) computed based on the date a fund
was first offered (CRSP variable first_offer_dt).
CRSP, EST
Expense ratioi , t Fund i’s annual expense ratio. CRSP
12b-1 feesi , t Fund i’s actual 12b-1 fees. CRSP
Turnover ratioi , t Fund i’s annual turnover ratio. CRSP
Fund riski , t Fund i’s monthly return standard deviation in year t. CRSP, EST
Systematic riski , t Fund i’s factor loading on the market factor from a one-factor model in year t. CRSP, EST
Unsystematic
riski , t
Standard deviation of fund i’s residual return from a one-factor model in year t. CRSP, EST
SV fi ,m Style variability of fund i with respect to a specific factor f while manager m is
managing this fund. It is calculated as the standard deviation of a fund’s yearly
factor loadings on factor f over time. The Carhart (1997) SMB, HML, and MOM
factors are considered. Standard deviations are rescaled by the average factor
weighting standard deviation of all funds in the corresponding market segment
over the same period. At least three years of consecutive data are required.
CRSP, EST
SVTotali ,m Average style variability of fund i calculated as the average of the factor
individual style variability measures, SVM fi ,m .
CRSP, EST
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Appendix. (Continued)
Variable name Description Source
Panel A: Fund characteristics (continued)
Segment flowi , t Average of Fund flowsi , t over all funds i belonging to the same segment as fund i
in year t, net of flows in fund i.
CRSP, EST
Company flowi , t Value weighted average of Fund flowsi , t over all funds i belonging to the same
fund company as fund i in year t, net of flows in fund i.
CRSP, EST
Manager changei , t Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a manager change at fund i in year t and
0 otherwise.
EST
Female manager
replaces malei , t
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a male manager at fund i is replaced by a female
manager in year t and 0 otherwise.
MSD
Young manager
replaces oldi , t
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a manager at fund i is replaced by a younger
manager in year t and 0 otherwise.
EST
No-load fundi , t Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund’s share class does not charge a front-end
load in year t and 0 otherwise.
CRSP, EST
Any female
manager in
companyi , t
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund company fund i belongs to employs at
least one female fund manager in year t and 0 otherwise.
MSD, CRSP
Number of female
managers in
companyi , t
Number of female fund managers that the fund company fund i belongs to
employs in year t.
MSD, CRSP
Panel B: Manager characteristics
Manager tenurei , t Tenure of fund i’s manager in years, computed as difference between year t and
the year in which the manager started managing fund i.
MSP, EST
Manager agei , t Logarithm of a fund manager’s age in years (plus 1). Data are manually collected
from manager biographies.
MSP, MSD, CIQ
Manager has
bachelor’si , t
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund manager has obtained a bachelor’s degree
and 0 otherwise. Data are manually collected from manager biographies.
MSP, MSD, CIQ
Manager has
MBAi , t
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund manager has obtained a Master of Business
Administration (MBA) degree and 0 otherwise. Data are manually collected
from manager biographies.
MSP, MSD, CIQ
Manager has
PhDi , t
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund manager has obtained a PhD degree and
0 otherwise. Data are manually collected from manager biographies.
MSP, MSD, CIQ
Professional
qualificationi , t
Dummy variable equal to 1if a fund manager has obtained a professional
qualification (mainly CFA, but also others such as certified financial planner or
certified public accountant) and 0 otherwise. Data are manually collected from
manager biographies.
MSP, MSD, CIQ
Foreign manageri , t Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least 75% of respondents on Amazon Mechanical
Turk indicated that the fund manager’s name sounds foreign and 0 otherwise.
Data are obtained from Kumar et al. (2015).
MSD, AMT
Manager’s media
coveragei , t
Logarithm of the number of articles on fund i’s manager in year t. Details on the
media data collection process are described in Section IA-2.2 in the internet
appendix.
LN
Panel C: Experimental variables
d(R) Difference in mean reaction times in milliseconds between the incompatible and
the compatible configurations in the IAT.
EXP, EST
Female
managerfund A
Dummy variable equal to 1 if fund A is managed by a female manager and
0 otherwise.
EXP, EST
Subject IAT score j Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IAT score of subject j is above the median and
0 otherwise.
EXP
Female subject j Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject j is female and 0 otherwise. EXP
FinEcon j Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject j studies finance or economics and
0 otherwise.
EXP, EST
High literacy j Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject j answered at least four of six financial
literacy questions correctly and 0 otherwise.
EXP
Notes. This table briefly defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The data sources are (i) CRSP Survivor-Bias-
Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database (CRSP), (ii) Capital IQ (CIQ), (iii) estimated or computed by the authors (EST), (iv) exper-
imental data (EXP), (v) Kenneth French’s data library (KF; http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html, accessed September 27, 2010), (vi) LexisNexis (LN), (vii) Morningstar Direct (MSD), (viii) Morningstar
Principia (MSP), and (ix) Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).
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Endnotes
1Anecdotal evidence from interviews with fund managers suggests
that this is indeed the case: when asked why female-managed funds
might attract less capital, one fund manager stated, “There’s some-
thing that prevents people from being totally comfortable about sign-
ing their money over to a woman . . . a lot of negatives are applied”
(quoted in National Council for Research on Women 2009, p. 10,
ellipses in original).
2A short introductory note on the IAT is Carney et al. (2007).
3See https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf (accessed April 11,
2018).
4There are only two papers we are aware of that use IATs in the
economics literature: Bertrand et al. (2005) use an IAT to examine
hiring discrimination against African Americans, and Beaman et al.
(2009) apply an IAT to measure attitudes toward female leaders.
5Specifically, we use the following 12 equity fund segments: AG
(aggressive growth), BAL (balanced funds), EM (emerging mar-
kets), GE (global equity), GI (growth and income), IE (international
equity), IN (income), LG (long-term growth), RE (regional funds),
SE (sector funds), UT (utility funds), and TR (total return).
6For further information, see https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/
decades/index.html (accessed April 11, 2018).
7Data can be obtained from https://nces.ed.gov/datatools/.
8As of March 31, 2015; see Lutton and Davis (2015).
9More detailed summary statistics are provided in Table IA-I in the
internet appendix.
10Fund flows are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Winsorizing
them at the top and bottom 5% does not change the results (see
panel A, column (7) of Table IA-II in the internet appendix).
11As in Sirri and Tufano (1998), we pool together the three middle
performance quintiles—that is, slope coefficients are estimated sep-
arately for the lowest, the three middle, and the top quintiles of past
performance. We use performance ranks because Patel et al. (1991)
show that ordinal performance measures can explain fund flows bet-
ter than cardinal measures. Ranks are calculated for each year and
segment separately and are evenly distributed between 0 and 1.
12Company flows and segment flows are computed net of the flows
in the fund under consideration.
13 In an alternative specification, we include combined fund com-
pany-year fixed effects to control for the possibly time-varying nature
of these fund company-level characteristics. Results (reported in
panel C, column (2) in Table IA-II in the internet appendix) remain
largely unaffected.
14We do not include a separate dummy for bachelor’s degrees, as
virtually all managers hold at least a bachelor’s degree. Some fund
managers hold master’s degrees other than MBAs. Including con-
trols for non-MBA master’s does not change our findings.
15To test whether the negative impact of gender might be weak-
ened if the fund manager has a good education or a long tenure, in
unreported tests, we also interact the impact of the female manager
dummy with the education dummies and an above-median tenure
dummy. In all cases, we find no significant impact of the interaction
terms, while our main results remain unaffected.
16We drop all observations for share classes where information on
the load fee is missing from our data.
17 In unreported tests we also compare average factor loadings and
find thatwomen tend to have significantly lower (higher) loadings on
the book-to-market factor (HML) (momentum factor (MOM)), while
there is no significant difference with respect to the size factor (SMB)
loadings.
18Estimates of standard deviations can be biased if they are based on
a small number of observations. Thus, we repeat our analysis using
the variance of factor loadings over time. Results (not reported) are
qualitatively similar, but significance slightly decreases.
19Analyzing a variance-based measure of performance persistence
delivers very similar results.
20More details on the experimental procedure are provided in Sec-
tion IA-3.1 of the internet appendix.
21We took the most common U.S. first names according to the U.S.
Social Security Administration to ensure that subjects perceive these
names as very common for each gender category, and we use com-
mon last names.
22The experiment was part of a more extensive investigation where
subjects also made additional investment decisions. In this paper we
only report the results relevant in our context (i.e., the impact of
gender on index fund investments).
23Note that we only compare investments in fund A between sub-
jects conditional on the fund manager’s gender. Thus, the amounts
shown in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 do not add up to 100. By def-
inition, our conclusions would remain unchanged if we compared
investments in fund B instead.
24More recently, there has been some controversy in the psycho-
logical literature about the power of the IAT. Specifically, the IAT
has been criticized for producing noisy prejudice scores that might
not perform better than explicit measures of prejudice (for a meta-
analysis of IAT studies, see Oswald et al. 2013).
25To prevent outliers from driving the results, we follow Greenwald
et al. (1998) and set all unrealistically long reactions times (over 3 sec-
onds) equal to 3 seconds and all unrealistically short reaction times
(below 300 ms) equal to 300 ms.
26Alternatively, we use two other ways to compute IAT scores that
are also suggested in the literature (see Section IA-3.3 in the internet
appendix). Our results are virtually identical.
27The only two companies that did not report themanager’s name on
their web page are Dimensional Fund Advisors and Capital Growth
Management. However, even these companies reported the man-
ager’s name in the prospectus. For 74% of the funds, the manager’s
name was reported on the main website of the fund (instead of only
being visible after clicking once more or just being included in the
fund prospectus).
28To illustrate this point, in Figure IA-I in the internet appendix we
present screenshots of the information investors would get if they
search for a specific fund in four of the major online financial infor-
mation sources.
29Of course, field data on index fund investment behavior would
also be a clean test setting in our context. Unfortunately, given the
relatively small number of index funds and the resulting tiny number
of female index fund managers, such a test would lack statistical
power.
30Consistent with this argument, there are indeed some niche funds
such as the Pax Ellevate GlobalWomen’s Index Fund that specifically
cater to female investors.
31Alternatively, we define this dummy as being 1 if there is any
other female manager in the same fund company in a single- or
team-managed fund. Hiding female managers in teams to avoid the
negative direct flow consequences while still fulfilling diversity goals
could be in the interest of fund companies. Results using this alter-
native definition are very similar.
32As these variables might also proxy for the size of the fund com-
pany (as it is more likely to have at least one female manager if there
are simply more other funds), we again include company-level flows
as the control variable. This variable captures the impact of the size
of the fund company (and of all other fund company characteristics)
on individual-level flows.
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